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Abstract
Differential privacy is a strong notion for privacy that can
be used to prove formal guarantees, in terms of a privacy
budget, , about how much information is leaked by a mecha-
nism. However, implementations of privacy-preserving ma-
chine learning often select large values of  in order to get
acceptable utility of the model, with little understanding of
the impact of such choices on meaningful privacy. Moreover,
in scenarios where iterative learning procedures are used, dif-
ferential privacy variants that offer tighter analyses are used
which appear to reduce the needed privacy budget but present
poorly understood trade-offs between privacy and utility. In
this paper, we quantify the impact of these choices on privacy
in experiments with logistic regression and neural network
models. Our main finding is that there is a huge gap between
the upper bounds on privacy loss that can be guaranteed, even
with advanced mechanisms, and the effective privacy loss
that can be measured using current inference attacks. Current
mechanisms for differentially private machine learning rarely
offer acceptable utility-privacy trade-offs with guarantees for
complex learning tasks: settings that provide limited accuracy
loss provide meaningless privacy guarantees, and settings that
provide strong privacy guarantees result in useless models.
1 Introduction
Differential privacy has become a de facto privacy standard,
and nearly all works on privacy-preserving machine learning
use some form of differential privacy. These works include
designs for differentially private versions of prominent ma-
chine learning algorithms including empirical risk minimiza-
tion [11, 12] and deep neural networks [1, 61].
While many methods for achieving differential privacy
have been proposed, it is not well understood how to use
these methods in practice. In particular, there is little concrete
guidance on how to choose an appropriate privacy budget
, and limited understanding of how variants of the differen-
tial privacy definition impact privacy in practice. As a result,
privacy-preserving machine learning implementations tend to
choose arbitrary values for  as needed to achieve acceptable
model utility. For instance, the implementation of Shokri and
Shmatikov [61] requires  proportional to the size of the tar-
get deep learning model, which could be in the order of few
millions. Setting  to such arbitrarily large values severely
undermines the value of the privacy guarantees provided by
differential privacy, although there is no consensus on a hard
threshold value for  above which formal guarantees differen-
tial privacy provides become meaningless in practice.
One proposed way to improve utility for a given privacy
budget is to tighten the composition of differential privacy.
Several differential privacy variants have been proposed that
can provide a tighter analysis of the privacy budget under
composition [9, 18, 50], so can achieve what appears to be
more privacy (i.e., lower  values) for the same amount of
noise, thus providing better utility even for given  values.
How much privacy leaks in adversarial scenarios, however,
is not well understood. We shed light on this question by
evaluating the mechanisms using different differential privacy
variants for different choices of  values and empirically mea-
suring the privacy leakage, including how many individual
training records are exposed by membership inference attacks
on different models.
Contributions. Our main contribution is the evaluation of
differential privacy mechanisms for machine learning to un-
derstand the impact of different choices of , across different
variants of differential privacy, on both utility and privacy. We
focus our evaluation on gradient perturbation mechanisms,
which are applicable to a wide class of machine learning al-
gorithms including empirical risk minimization (ERM) algo-
rithms such as logistic regression and deep learning (Section
2.2). Our experiments cover three popular differential privacy
variants (summarized in Section 2.1): differential privacy with
advanced composition (AC), zero-concentrated differential
privacy [9] (zCDP), and Rényi differential privacy [50] (RDP).
These variations allow for tighter analysis of cumulative pri-
vacy loss, thereby reducing the noise that must be added in
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the training process to satisfy a particular privacy budget. We
evaluate the concrete privacy loss of these variations using
membership inference attacks [62, 75] and attribute inference
attacks [75] (Section 3).
While the model utility increases with the privacy budget
(for any otherwise fixed setting), increasing the privacy bud-
get also increases the success rate of inference attacks. Hence,
we aim to find values of  that achieve a balance between
utility and privacy, and to understand the impact of privacy
leakage concretely. We study both logistic regression and
neural network models, on two multi-class classification data
sets. Our key findings (Section 4) quantify the practical risks
of using different differential privacy notions across a range
of privacy budgets. Our main result is that, at least for the
settings we consider, there is a huge gulf between what can be
guaranteed by any differential privacy mechanism and what
can be observed by known attacks. For acceptable utility lev-
els, the guarantees are essentially meaningless regardless of
the differential privacy variant, although the observed leakage
by attacks is still relatively low.
Related work. Orthogonal to our work, Ding et al. [13] and
Hay et al. [26] evaluate the existing differential privacy imple-
mentations for the correctness of implementation. Whereas,
we assume correct implementations and aim to evaluate the
impact of the privacy budget and choice of differential privacy
variant. While Carlini et al. [10] also explore the effectiveness
of differential privacy against attacks, they do not explicitly
answer what values of  should be used nor do they evalu-
ate the privacy leakage of the differential privacy variants.
Li et al. [42] raise concerns about relaxing the differential
privacy notion in order to achieve better overall utility, but
do not evaluate the leakage. We perform a thorough evalua-
tion of the differential privacy variations and quantify their
leakage for different privacy budgets. The work of Rahman
et al. [59] is most closely related to our work. It evaluates
differential privacy implementations against membership in-
ference attacks, but does not evaluate the privacy leakage
of different variants of differential privacy. Recently, Liu et
al. [43] reported on extensive hypothesis testing differentially
private machine learning using the Neyman-Pearson criterion.
They give guidance on setting the privacy budget based on
assumptions about the adversary’s knowledge considering
different types of auxiliary information that an adversary can
obtain to strengthen the membership inference attack such as
prior probability distribution of data, record correlation, and
temporal correlation.
2 Differential Privacy for Machine Learning
Next, we review the definition of differential privacy and sev-
eral variants. Section 2.2 surveys mechanisms for achieving
differentially private machine learning. Section 2.3 summa-
rizes applications of differential privacy to machine learning
and surveys implementations’ choices about privacy budgets.
2.1 Background on Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is a probabilistic privacy mechanism
that provides an information-theoretic security guarantee.
Dwork [16] gives the following definition:
Definition 2.1 ((,δ)-Differential Privacy). Given two neigh-
boring data sets D and D′ differing by one record, a mecha-
nismM preserves (,δ)-differential privacy if
Pr[M(D) ∈ S ] ≤ Pr[M(D′) ∈ S ]× e +δ
where  is the privacy budget and δ is the failure probability.
When δ = 0 we achieve a strictly stronger notion of -
differential privacy.
The quantity
ln
Pr[M(D) ∈ S ]
Pr[M(D′) ∈ S ]
is called the privacy loss.
One way to achieve -DP and (,δ)-DP is to add noise sam-
pled from Laplace and Gaussian distributions respectively,
where the noise is proportional to the sensitivity of the mech-
anismM:
Definition 2.2 (Sensitivity). For two neighboring data sets
D and D′ differing by one record, the sensitivity ofM is the
maximum change in the output ofM over all possible inputs:
∆M = max
D,D′,‖D−D′‖1=1
‖M(D)−M(D′)‖
where ‖ · ‖ is a norm of the vector. Throughout this paper we
assume `2-sensitivity which considers the upper bound on the
`2-norm ofM(D)−M(D′).
Composition. Differential privacy satisfies a simple compo-
sition property: when two mechanisms with privacy budgets
1 and 2 are performed on the same data, together they con-
sume a privacy budget of 1 + 2. Thus, composing multiple
differentially private mechanisms leads to a linear increase
in the privacy budget (or corresponding increases in noise to
maintain a fixed  total privacy budget).
Variants. Dwork [17] showed that this linear composition
bound on  can be reduced at the cost of slightly increasing
the failure probability δ. In essence, this relaxation considers
the linear composition of expected privacy loss of mecha-
nisms which can be converted to a cumulative privacy budget
 with high probability bound. Dwork defines this as the ad-
vanced composition theorem, and proves that it applies to any
differentially private mechanism.
Three commonly-used subsequent variants of differential
privacy which provide improved composition are Concen-
trated Differential Privacy [18], Zero Concentrated Differ-
ential Privacy [9], and Rényi Differential Privacy [50]. All
Advanced Comp. Concentrated (CDP) Zero-Concentrated (zCDP) Rényi (RDP)
Expected Loss (e −1) µ = (e−1)2 ζ +ρ = 
2
2 2
2
Variance of Loss 2 τ2 = 2 2ρ = 2 2
Convert from -DP - ( (e
−1)
2 , )-CDP (
2
2 )-zCDP (α,)-RDP
Convert to DP - (µ+τ
√
2log(1/δ), δ)-DP† (ζ +ρ+ 2
√
ρ log(1/δ), δ)-DP ( + log(1/δ)α−1 , δ)-DP
Composition of k
-DP Mechanisms
(
√
2k log(1/δ)
+ k(e −1), δ)-DP
(
√
2k log(1/δ)
+ k(e −1)/2, δ)-DP
(
√
2k log(1/δ)
+ k2/2, δ)-DP
(4
√
2k log(1/δ), δ)-DP‡
Table 1: Comparison of Different Variations of Differential Privacy
Advanced composition is an implicit property of DP and hence there is no conversion to and from DP.
†. Derived indirectly via zCDP. ‡. When log(1/δ) ≥ 2k.
of these achieve tighter analysis of cumulative privacy loss
by taking advantage of the fact that the privacy loss random
variable is strictly centered around an expected privacy loss.
The cumulative privacy budget obtained from these analy-
ses bounds the worst case privacy loss of the composition of
mechanisms with all but δ failure probability. This reduces
the noise required to satisfy a given privacy budget and hence
improves utility over multiple compositions. However, it is
important to consider the actual impact the noise reductions
enabled by these variants have on the privacy leakage, which
is a main focus of this paper.
Note that the variants are just different techniques for an-
alyzing the composition of the mechanism—by themselves
they do not impact the noise added, which is all the actual
privacy depends on. What they do is enable a tighter analy-
sis of the guaranteed privacy. This means for a fixed privacy
budget, the relaxed definitions can be satisfied by adding less
noise than would be required for looser analyses, hence they
result in less privacy for the same  level. Throughout the
paper, for simplicity, we refer to the differential privacy vari-
ants but implicitly mean the mechanism used to satisfy that
definition of differential privacy. Thus, when we say RDP has
a given privacy leakage, it means the corresponding gradient
perturbation mechanism has that privacy leakage when it is
analyzed using RDP to bound its cumulative privacy loss.
Dwork et al. [18] note that the privacy loss of a differen-
tially private mechanism follows a sub-Gaussian distribution.
In other words, the privacy loss is strictly distributed around
the expected privacy loss and the spread is controlled by the
variance of the sub-Gaussian distribution. Multiple composi-
tions of differentially private mechanisms thus result in the
aggregation of corresponding mean and variance values of the
individual sub-Gaussian distributions. This can be converted
to a cumulative privacy budget similar to the advanced com-
position theorem, which in turn reduces the noise that must
be added to the individual mechanisms. The authors call this
concentrated differential privacy (CDP) [18]:
Definition 2.3 (Concentrated Differential Privacy). A ran-
domized algorithmM is (µ,τ)-concentrated differentially pri-
vate if, for all pairs of adjacent data sets D and D′,
DsubG(M(D) || M(D′)) ≤ (µ,τ)
where the sub-Gaussian divergence, DsubG, is defined such
that the expected privacy loss is bounded by µ and after
subtracting µ, the resulting centered sub-Gaussian distribu-
tion has standard deviation τ. Any -DP algorithm satisfies
( · (e −1)/2, )-CDP, however the converse is not true.
A variation on CDP, zero-concentrated differential privacy
(zCDP) [9] uses Rényi divergence as a different method to
show that the privacy loss random variable follows a sub-
Gaussian distribution:
Definition 2.4 (Zero-Concentrated Differential Privacy). A
randomized mechanismM is (ξ,ρ)-zero-concentrated differ-
entially private if, for all neighbouring data sets D and D′ and
all α ∈ (1,∞),
Dα(M(D) || M(D′)) ≤ ξ+ρα
where Dα(M(D) || M(D′)) is the α-Rényi divergence be-
tween the distribution ofM(D) and the distribution ofM(D′).
Dα also gives the α-th moment of the privacy loss random
variable. For example,D1 gives the first order moment which
is the mean or the expected privacy loss, and D2 gives the
second order moment or the variance of privacy loss. There is
a direct relation between DP and zCDP. IfM satisfies -DP,
then it also satisfies ( 12 
2)-zCDP. Furthermore, ifM provides
ρ-zCDP, it is (ρ+ 2
√
ρ log(1/δ), δ)-DP for any δ > 0.
The Rényi divergence allows zCDP to be mapped back
to DP, which is not the case for CDP. However, Bun and
Steinke [9] give a relationship between CDP and zCDP, which
allows an indirect mapping from CDP to DP (Table 1).
The use of Rényi divergence as a metric to bound the pri-
vacy loss leads to the formulation of a more generic notion
of Rényi differential privacy (RDP) that is applicable to any
individual moment of privacy loss random variable:
Definition 2.5 (Rényi Differential Privacy [50]). A random-
ized mechanismM is said to have -Rényi differential privacy
of order α (which can be abbreviated as (α,)-RDP), if for
any adjacent data sets D, D′ it holds that
Dα(M(D) || M(D′)) ≤ .
The main difference is that CDP and zCDP linearly bound
all positive moments of privacy loss, whereas RDP bounds
one moment at a time, which allows for a more accurate
numerical analysis of privacy loss. If M is an (α,)-RDP
mechanism, it also satisfies (+ log1/δα−1 , δ)-DP for any 0< δ < 1.
Table 1 compares the relaxed variations of differential pri-
vacy. For all the variations, the privacy budget grows sub-
linearly with the number of compositions k.
Moments Accountant. Motivated by the variants of differen-
tial privacy, Abadi et al. [1] propose the moments accountant
(MA) mechanism for bounding the cumulative privacy loss
of differentially private algorithms. The moments accoun-
tant keeps track of a bound on the moments of the privacy
loss random variable during composition. Though the authors
do not formalize this as a differential privacy variant, their
definition of the moments bound is analogous to the Rényi
divergence [50]. Thus, the moments accountant can be con-
sidered as an instantiation of Rényi differential privacy. The
moments accountant is widely used for differentially private
deep learning due to its practical implementation in the Ten-
sorFlow Privacy library [2] (see Section 2.3 and Table 4).
2.2 Differential Privacy Methods for ML
This section summarizes methods for modifying machine
learning algorithms to satisfy differential privacy. First, we
review convex optimization problems, such as empirical risk
minimization (ERM) algorithms, and show several methods
for achieving differential privacy during the learning process.
Next, we discuss methods that can be applied to non-convex
optimization problems, including deep learning.
ERM. Given a training data set (X,y), where X is a feature
matrix and y is the vector of class labels, an ERM algorithm
aims to reduce the convex objective function of the form,
J(θ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
`(θ,Xi,yi) +λR(θ),
where `(·) is a convex loss function (such as mean square error
(MSE) or cross-entropy loss) that measures the training loss
for a given θ, and R(·) is a regularization function. Commonly
used regularization functions include `1 penalty, which makes
the vector θ sparse, and `2 penalty, which shrinks the values
of θ vector.
The goal of the algorithm is to find the optimal θ∗ that min-
imizes the objective function: θ∗ = argminθ J(θ). While many
Data: Training data set (X,y)
Result: Model parameters θ
θ← Init(0)
#1. Add noise here: objective perturbation
J(θ) = 1n
∑n
i=1 `(θ,Xi,yi) +λR(θ)+β
for epoch in epochs do
#2. Add noise here: gradient perturbation
θ = θ−η(∇J(θ)+β)
end
#3. Add noise here: output perturbation
return θ+β
Algorithm 1: Privacy noise mechanisms.
first order [14, 37, 58, 77] and second order [40, 44] meth-
ods exist to solve this minimization problem, the most basic
procedure is gradient descent where we iteratively calculate
the gradient of J(θ) with respect to θ and update θ with the
gradient information. This process is repeated until J(θ) ≈ 0
or some other termination condition is met.
There are three obvious candidates for where to add privacy-
preserving noise during this training process, demarcated in
Algorithm 1. First, we could add noise to the objective func-
tion J(θ), which gives us the objective perturbation mech-
anism (#1 in Algorithm 1). Second, we could add noise to
the gradients at each iteration, which gives us the gradient
perturbation mechanism (#2). Finally, we can add noise to θ∗
obtained after the training, which gives us the output perturba-
tion mechanism (#3). While there are other methods of achiev-
ing differential privacy such as input perturbation [15], sample-
aggregate framework [52], exponential mechanism [49] and
teacher ensemble framework [53]. We focus our experimental
analysis on gradient perturbation since it is applicable to all
machine learning algorithms in general and is widely used for
deep learning with differential privacy.
The amount of noise that must be added depends on the
sensitivity of the machine learning algorithm. For instance,
consider logistic regression with `2 regularization penalty.
The objective function is of the form:
J(θ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
log(1 + e−X
>
i θyi ) +
λ
2
‖ θ ‖22
Assume that the training features are bounded, ‖Xi‖2 ≤ 1 and
yi ∈ {−1,1}. Chaudhuri et al. [12] prove that for this setting,
objective perturbation requires sampling noise in the scale
of 2n , and output perturbation requires sampling noise in the
scale of 2nλ . The gradient of the objective function is:
∇J(θ) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
−Xiyi
1 + eX
>
i θyi
+λθ
which has a sensitivity of 2n . Thus, gradient perturbation re-
quires sampling noise in the scale of 2n at each iteration.
Deep learning. Deep learning follows the same learning pro-
cedure as in Algorithm 1, but the objective function is non-
convex. As a result, the sensitivity analysis methods of Chaud-
huri et al. [12] do not hold as they require a strong convexity
assumption. Hence, their output and objective perturbation
methods are not applicable. An alternative approach is to
replace the non-convex function with a convex polynomial
function [56, 57], and then use the standard objective pertur-
bation. This approach requires carefully designing convex
polynomial functions that can approximate the non-convexity,
which can still limit the model’s learning capacity. Moreover,
it would require a considerable change in the existing machine
learning infrastructure.
A simpler and more popular approach is to add noise to
the gradients. Application of gradient perturbation requires
a bound on the gradient norm. Since the gradient norm can
be unbounded in deep learning, gradient perturbation can be
used after manually clipping the gradients at each iteration. As
noted by Abadi et al. [1], norm clipping provides a sensitivity
bound on the gradients which is required for generating noise
in gradient perturbation.
2.3 Implementing Differential Privacy
This section surveys how differential privacy has been used in
machine learning applications, with a particular focus on the
compromises implementers have made to obtain satisfactory
utility. While the effective privacy provided by differential
privacy mechanisms depends crucially on the choice of pri-
vacy budget , setting the  value is discretionary and often
done as necessary o achieve acceptable utlity without any
consideration of privacy.
Some of the early data analytics works on frequent pattern
mining [7,41], decision trees [21], private record linkage [30]
and recommender systems [48] were able to achieve both high
utility and privacy with  settings close to 1. These methods
rely on finding frequency counts as a sub-routine, and hence
provide -differential privacy by either perturbing the counts
using Laplace noise or by releasing the top frequency counts
using the exponential mechanism [49]. Machine learning, on
the other hand, performs much more complex data analysis,
and hence requires higher privacy budgets to maintain utility.
Next, we cover simple binary classification works that use
small privacy budgets ( ≤ 1). Then we survey complex clas-
sification tasks which seem to require large privacy budgets.
Finally, we summarize recent works that aim to perform com-
plex tasks with low privacy budgets by using variants of dif-
ferential privacy that offer tighter bounds on composition.
Binary classification. The first practical implementation of a
private machine learning algorithm was proposed by Chaud-
huri and Monteleoni [11]. They provide a novel sensitivity
analysis under strong convexity constraints, allowing them to
use output and objective perturbation for binary logistic re-
gression. Chaudhuri et al. [12] subsequently generalized this
method for ERM algorithms. This sensitivity analysis method
has since been used by many works for binary classifica-
tion tasks under different learning settings (listed in Table 2).
While these applications can be implemented with low pri-
vacy budgets ( ≤ 1), they only perform learning in restricted
settings such as learning with low dimensional data, smooth
objective functions and strong convexity assumptions, and are
only applicable to simple binary classification tasks.
There has also been considerable progress in general-
izing privacy-preserving machine learning to more com-
plex scenarios such as learning in high-dimensional set-
tings [33, 34, 65], learning without strong convexity assump-
tions [66], or relaxing the assumptions on data and objective
functions [63, 69, 78]. However, these advances are mainly of
theoretical interest and only a few works provide implemen-
tations [33, 34].
Complex learning tasks. All of the above works are lim-
ited to convex learning problems with binary classification
tasks. Adopting their approaches to more complex learning
tasks requires higher privacy budgets (see Table 3). For in-
stance, the online version of ERM as considered by Jain et
al. [32] requires  as high as 10 to achieve acceptable utility.
From the definition of differential privacy, we can see that
Pr[M(D) ∈ S ] ≤ e10×Pr[M(D′) ∈ S ]. In other words, even if
the model’s output probability is 0.0001 on a data set D′ that
doesn’t contain the target record, the model’s output proba-
bility can be as high as 0.9999 on a neighboring data set D
that contains the record. This allows an adversary to infer
the presence or absence of a target record from the training
data with high confidence. Adopting these binary classifica-
tion methods for multi-class classification tasks requires even
higher  values. As noted by Wu et al. [71], it would require
training a separate binary classifier for each class. Finally,
high privacy budgets are required for non-convex learning
algorithms, such as deep learning [61, 80]. Since the output
and objective perturbation methods of Chaudhuri et al. [12]
are not applicable to non-convex settings, implementations
of differentially private deep learning rely on gradient pertur-
bation in their iterative learning procedure. These methods
do not scale to large numbers of training iterations due to
the composition theorem of differential privacy which causes
the privacy budget to accumulate across iterations. The only
exceptions are the works of Phan et al. [56, 57] that replace
the non-linear functions in deep learning with polynomial
approximations and then apply objective perturbation. With
this transformation, they achieve high model utility for  = 1,
as shown in Table 3. However, we note that this polynomial
approximation is a non-standard approach to deep learning
which can limit the model’s learning capacity, and thereby
diminish the model’s accuracy for complex tasks.
Machine learning with other DP definitions. To avoid the
stringent composition property of differential privacy, several
Perturbation Data Set n d 
Chaudhuri et al. [12] Output and Objective
Adult 45,220 105 0.2
KDDCup99 70,000 119 0.2
Pathak et al. [55] Output Adult 45,220 105 0.2
Hamm et al. [25] Output
KDDCup99 493,000 123 1.0
URL 200,000 50 1.0
Zhang et al. [79] Objective
US 370,000 14 0.8
Brazil 190,000 14 0.8
Jain and Thakurta [33] Objective
CoverType 500,000 54 0.5
KDDCup2010 20,000 2M 0.5
Jain and Thakurta [34] Output and Objective
URL 100,000 20M 0.1
COD-RNA 60,000 8 0.1
Song et al. [64] Gradient
KDDCup99 50,000 9 1.0
MNIST† 60,000 15 1.0
Wu et al. [71] Output
Protein 72,876 74 0.05
CoverType 498,010 54 0.05
Jayaraman et al. [35] Output
Adult 45,220 104 0.5
KDDCup99 70,000 122 0.5
Table 2: Simple ERM Methods which achieve High Utility with Low Privacy Budget.
†While MNIST is normally a 10-class task, Song et al. [64] use this for ‘1 vs rest’ binary classification.
proposed privacy-preserving deep learning methods adopt the
differential privacy variants introduced in Section 2.1. Table 4
lists works that use gradient perturbation with differential
privacy variants to reduce the overall privacy budget during
iterative learning. The utility benefit of using these variants is
evident from the fact that the privacy budget for deep learning
algorithms is significantly less than the prior works of Shokri
and Shmatikov [61] and Zhao et al. [80].
While these variants of differential privacy make complex
iterative learning feasible for reasonable  values, they might
lead to more privacy leakage in practice. The main goal of
our study is to evaluate the impact of implementation deci-
sions regarding the privacy budget and variants of differential
privacy on the concrete privacy leakage that can be exploited
by an attacker in practice. We do this by experimenting with
various inference attacks, described in the next section.
3 Inference Attacks on Machine Learning
This section surveys the two types of inference attacks, mem-
bership inference (Section 3.1) and attribute inference (Sec-
tion 3.2), and explains why they are useful metrics for evalu-
ating privacy leakage. Section 3.3 briefly summarizes other
relevant privacy attacks on machine learning.
3.1 Membership Inference
The aim of a membership inference attack is to infer whether
or not a given record is present in the training set. Membership
inference attacks can uncover highly sensitive information
from training data. An early membership inference attack
showed that it is possible to identify individuals contributing
DNA to studies that analyze a mixture of DNA from many
individuals, using a statistical distance measure to determine
if a known individual is in the mixture [27].
Membership inference attacks can either be completely
black-box where an attacker only has query access to the
target model [62], or can assume that the attacker has full
white-box access to the target model, along with some auxil-
iary information [75]. The first membership inference attack
on machine learning was proposed by Shokri et al. [62]. They
consider an attacker who can query the target model in a
black-box way to obtain confidence scores for the queried
input. The attacker tries to exploit the confidence score to
determine whether the query input was present in the train-
ing data. Their attack method involves first training shadow
models on a labelled data set, which can be generated either
via black-box queries to the target model or through assump-
tions about the underlying distribution of training set. The
attacker then trains an attack model using the shadow models
to distinguish whether or not an input record is in the shadow
training set. Finally, the attacker makes API calls to the target
model to obtain confidence scores for each given input record
and infers whether or not the input was part of the target
model’s training set. The inference model distinguishes the
target model’s predictions for inputs that are in its training set
from those it did not train on. The key assumption is that the
confidence score of the target model is higher for the training
Task Perturbation Data Set n d C 
Jain et al. [32] Online ERM Objective
Year 500,000 90 2 10
CoverType 581,012 54 2 10
Iyengar et al. [31]
Binary ERM
Objective
Adult 45,220 104 2 10
Binary ERM KDDCup99 70,000 114 2 10
Multi-Class ERM CoverType 581,012 54 7 10
Multi-Class ERM MNIST 65,000 784 10 10
High Dimensional ERM Gisette 6,000 5,000 2 10
Phan et al. [56, 57] Deep Learning Objective
YesiWell 254 30 2 1
MNIST 60,000 784 10 1
Shokri and Shmatikov [61] Deep Learning Gradient
MNIST 60,000 1,024 10 369,200
SVHN 100,000 3,072 10 369,200
Zhao et al. [80] Deep Learning Gradient
US 500,000 20 2 100
MNIST 60,000 784 10 100
Table 3: Classification Methods for Complex Tasks
Task DP Notion Data Set n d C 
Huang et al. [28] ERM MA Adult 21,000 14 2 0.5
Jayaraman et al. [35] ERM zCDP
Adult 45,220 104 2 0.5
KDDCup99 70,000 122 2 0.5
Park et al. [54] ERM zCDP and MA
Stroke 50,345 100 2 0.5
LifeScience 26,733 10 2 2.0
Gowalla 1,256,384 2 2 0.01
OlivettiFace 400 4,096 2 0.3
Lee [39] ERM zCDP
Adult 48,842 124 2 1.6
US 40,000 58 2 1.6
Brazil 38,000 53 2 1.6
Geumlek et al. [23] ERM RDP
Abalone 2,784 9 2 1.0
Adult 32,561 100 2 0.05
MNIST 7,988 784 2 0.14
Beaulieu et al. [6] Deep Learning MA
eICU 4,328 11 2 3.84
TCGA 994 500 2 6.11
Abadi et al. [1] Deep Learning MA
MNIST 60,000 784 10 2.0
CIFAR 60,000 3,072 10 8.0
Yu et al. [76] Deep Learning MA
MNIST 60,000 784 10 21.5
CIFAR 60,000 3,072 10 21.5
Papernot et al. [53] Deep Learning MA
MNIST 60,000 784 10 2.0
SVHN 60,000 3,072 10 8.0
Geyer et al. [24] Deep Learning MA MNIST 60,000 784 10 8.0
Bhowmick et al. [8] Deep Learning MA
MNIST 60,000 784 10 3.0
CIFAR 60,000 3,072 10 3.0
Hynes et al. [29] Deep Learning MA CIFAR 50,000 3,072 10 4.0
Table 4: Gradient Perturbation based Classification Methods using Different Notions of Differential Privacy
instances than it would be for arbitrary instances not present
in the training set. This can be due to the generalization gap,
which is prominent in models that overfit to training data.
A more targeted approach was proposed by Long et al. [45]
where the shadow models are trained with and without a tar-
geted input record t. At inference time, the attacker can check
if the input record t was present in the training set of tar-
get model. This approach tests the membership of a specific
record more accurately than Shokri et al.’s approach [62]. Re-
cently, Salem et al. [60] proposed more generic membership
inference attacks by relaxing the requirements of Shokri et
al. [62]. In particular, requirements on the number of shadow
models, knowledge of training data distribution and the tar-
get model architecture can be relaxed without substantially
degrading the effectiveness of the attack.
Yeom et al. [75] recently proposed a more computationally
efficient membership inference attack when the attacker has
access to the target model and knows the average training loss
of the model. To test the membership of an input record, the
attacker evaluates the loss of the model on the input record
and then classifies it as a member if the loss is smaller than
the average training loss.
Connection to Differential Privacy. Differential privacy, by
definition, aims to obfuscate the presence or absence of a
record in the data set. On the other hand, membership in-
ference attacks aim to identify the presence or absence of
a record in the data set. Thus, intuitively these two notions
counteract each other. Li et al. [42] point to this fact and
provide a direct relationship between differential privacy and
membership inference attacks. Backes et al. [4] studied mem-
bership inference attacks on microRNA studies and showed
that differential privacy can reduce the success of membership
inference attacks, but at the cost of utility.
Yeom et al. [75] formally define a membership inference
attack as an adversarial game where a data element is selected
from the distribution, which is randomly either included in
the training set or not. Then, an adversary with access to
the trained model attempts to determine if that element was
used in training. The membership advantage is defined as the
difference between the adversary’s true and false positive rates
for this game. The authors prove that if the learning algorithm
satisfies -differential privacy, then the adversary’s advantage
is bounded by e −1. Hence, it is natural to use membership
inference attacks as a metric to evaluate the privacy leakage
of differentially private algorithms.
3.2 Attribute Inference
The aim of an attribute inference attack (also called model
inversion) is to learn hidden sensitive attributes of a test in-
put given at least API access to the model and information
about the non-sensitive attributes. Fredrikson et al. [20] for-
malize this attack in terms of maximizing the posterior prob-
ability estimate of the sensitive attribute. More concretely,
for a test record x where the attacker knows the values of
its non-sensitive attributes x1, x2, · · · xd−1 and all the prior
probabilities of the attributes, the attacker obtains the out-
put of the model, f (x), and attempts to recover the value of
the sensitive attribute xd. The attacker essentially searches
for the value of xd that maximizes the posterior probability
P(xd | x1, x2, · · · xd−1, f (x)). The success of this attack is based
on the correlation between the sensitive attribute, xd, and the
model output, f (x).
Yeom et al. [75] also propose an attribute inference attack
using the same principle they use for their membership in-
ference attack. The attacker evaluates the model’s empirical
loss on the input instance for different values of the sensitive
attribute, and reports the value which has the maximum pos-
terior probability of achieving the empirical loss. The authors
define the attribute advantage similarly to their definition of
membership advantage for membership inference.
Fredrikson et al. [20] demonstrated attribute inference at-
tacks that could identify genetic markers based on warfarin
dosage output by a model with just black-box access to model
API.1 With additional access to confidence scores of the
model (noted as white-box information by Wu et al. [70]),
more complex tasks have been performed, such as recovering
faces from the training data [19].
Connection to Differential Privacy. Differential privacy is
mainly tailored to obfuscate the presence or absence of a
record in a data set, by limiting the effect of any single record
on the output of differential private model trained on the data
set. Logically this definition also extends to attributes or fea-
tures of a record. In other words, by adding sufficient differ-
ential privacy noise, we should be able to limit the effect of a
sensitive attribute on the model’s output. This relationship be-
tween records and attributes is discussed by Yeom et al. [75].
Hence, we include these attacks in our experiments.
3.3 Other Attacks on Machine Learning
Apart from inference attacks, many other attacks have been
proposed in the literature which try to infer specific infor-
mation from the target model. The most relevant are mem-
orization attacks, which try to exploit the ability of high
capacity models to memorize certain sensitive patterns in
the training data [10]. These attacks have been found to be
thwarted by differential privacy mechanisms with very little
noise ( = 109) [10].
Other privacy attacks include model stealing, hyperparame-
ter stealing, and property inference attacks. A model stealing
attack aims to recover the model parameters via black-box
access to the target model, either by adversarial learning [46]
1This application has stirred some controversy based on the warfarin
dosage output by the model itself being sensitive information correlated
to the sensitive genetic markers, hence the assumption on attacker’s prior
knowledge of warfarin dosage is somewhat unrealistic [47].
or by equation solving attacks [67]. Hyperparameter steal-
ing attacks try to recover the underlying hyperparameters
used during the model training, such as regularization coeffi-
cient [68] or model architecture [73]. These hyperparameters
are intellectual property of commercial organizations that de-
ploy machine learning models as a service, and hence these
attacks are regarded as a threat to valuable intellectual prop-
erty. A property inference attack tries to infer whether the
training data set has a specific property, given a white-box
access to the trained model. For instance, given access to a
speech recognition model, an attacker can infer if the train-
ing data set contains speakers with a certain accent. Here
the attacker can use the shadow training method of Shokri
et al. [62] for distinguishing the presence and absence of a
target property. These attacks have been performed on HMM
and SVM models [3] and neural networks [22].
Though all these attacks may leak sensitive information
about the target model or training data, the information leaked
tends to be application-specific and is not clearly defined in a
general way. For example, a property inference attack leaks
some statistical property of the training data that is surprising
to the model developer. Of course, the overall purpose of the
model is to learn statistical properties from the training data.
So, there is no general definition of a property inference attack
without a prescriptive decision about which statistical proper-
ties of the training data should be captured by the model and
which are sensitive to leak. In addition, the attacks mentioned
in this section do not closely follow the threat model of differ-
ential privacy. Thus, we only consider inference attacks for
our experimental evaluation.
In addition to these attacks, several attacks have been pro-
posed that require an adversary that can actively interfere with
the model training process [5, 51, 72, 74]. We consider these
out of scope, and assume a clean training process not under
the control of the adversary.
4 Empirical Evaluation
To quantify observable privacy leakage, we conduct exper-
iments to measure how much an adversary can infer from
a model. As motivated in Section 3, we measure privacy
leakage using membership and attribute inference in our ex-
periments. Note, however, that the conclusions we can draw
from experiments like this are limited to showing a lower
bound on the information leakage since they are measuring
the effectiveness of a particular attack. This contrasts with
differential privacy guarantees, which provide an upper bound
on possible leakage. Experimental results cannot be used to
make strong claims about what the best possible attack would
be able to infer, especially in cases where an adversary has
auxiliary information to help guide the attack. Evidence from
our experiments, however, can provide clear evidence that
implemented privacy protections do not appear to provide
sufficient privacy.
4.1 Experimental Setup
We evaluate the privacy leakage of two differentially private
algorithms using gradient perturbation: logistic regression
for empirical risk minimization (Section 4.2) and neural net-
works for non-convex learning (Section 4.3). For both, we
consider the different notions of differential privacy and com-
pare their privacy leakage. The variations that we implement
are naïve composition (NC), advanced composition (AC),
zero-concentrated differential privacy (zCDP) and Rényi dif-
ferential privacy (RDP) (see Section 2.1 for details). We do
not include CDP as it has the same composition property as
zCDP (Table 1). For RDP, we use the RDP accountant (previ-
ously known as the moments accountant) of the TF Privacy
framework [2].
We evaluate the models on two main metrics: accuracy
loss, the model’s accuracy on a test set relative to the non-
private baseline model, and privacy leakage, the attacker’s
advantage as defined by Yeom et al. [75]. The accuracy loss is
normalized with respect to the accuracy of non-private model
to clearly depict the model utility:
Accuracy Loss = 1− Accuracy of Private Model
Accuracy of Non-Private Model
.
To evaluate the inference attack, we provide the attacker
with a set of 20,000 records consisting of 10,000 records
from training set and 10,000 records from the test set. We
call records in the training set members, and the other records
non-members. These labels are not known to the attacker. The
task of the attacker is to predict whether or not a given input
record belongs to the training set (i.e., if it is a member). The
privacy leakage metric is calculated by taking the difference
between the true positive rate (TPR) and the false positive rate
(FPR) of the inference attack. Thus the privacy leakage metric
is always between 0 and 1, where the value of 0 indicates that
there is no leakage. For example, given that there are 100
member and 100 non-member records, if an attacker performs
membership inference on the model and correctly identifies
all the ‘true’ member records while falsely labelling 30 non-
member records as members, then the privacy leakage would
be 0.7. To better understand the potential impact of leakage,
we also conduct experiments to estimate the actual number
of members who are at risk for disclosure in a membership
inference attack.
Data sets. We evaluate our models over two data sets for
multi-class classification tasks: CIFAR-100 [38] and Purchase-
100 [36]. CIFAR-100 consists of 28×28 images of 100 real
world objects, with 500 instances of each object class. We
use PCA to reduce the dimensionality of records to 50. The
Purchase-100 data set consists of 200,000 customer purchase
records of size 100 each (corresponding to the 100 frequently-
purchased items) where the records are grouped into 100
classes based on the customers’ purchase style. For both data
sets, we use 10,000 randomly-selected instances for train-
ing and 10,000 randomly-selected non-training instances for
the test set. The remaining records are used for training the
shadow models and inference model used in the Shokri et al.
attacks.
Attacks. For our experiments, we use the attack frameworks
of Shokri et al. [62] and Yeom et al. [75] for membership
inference and the method proposed by Yeom et al. [75] for
attribute inference. In Shokri et al.’s framework [62], multiple
shadow models are trained on data that is sampled from the
same distribution as the private data set. These shadow mod-
els are used to train an inference model to identify whether
an input record belongs to the private data set. The inference
model is trained using a set of records used to train the shadow
models, a set of records randomly selected from the distribu-
tion that are not part of the shadow model training, along with
the confidence scores output by the shadow models for all
of the input records. Using these inputs, the inference model
learns to distinguish the training records from the non-training
records. At the inference stage, the inference model takes an
input record along with the confidence score of the target
model on the input record, and outputs whether the input
record belongs to the target model’s private training data set.
The intuition is that if the target model overfits on its training
set, its confidence score for a training record will be higher
than its confidence score for an otherwise similar input that
was not used in training. The inference model tries to exploit
this property. In our instantiation of the attack framework,
we use five shadow models which all have the same model
architecture as the target model. Our inference model is a
neural network with two hidden layers of size 64. This setting
is consistent with the original work [62].
The attack framework of Yeom et al. [75] is simpler than
Shokri et al.’s design. It assumes the attacker has access to
the target model’s expected training loss on the private train-
ing data set, in addition to having access to the target model.
For membership inference, the attacker simply observes the
target model’s loss on the input record. The attacker classifies
the record as a member if the loss is smaller than the target
model’s expected training loss, otherwise the record is classi-
fied as a non-member. The same principle is used for attribute
inference. Given an input record, the attacker brute-forces all
possible values for the unknown attribute and observes the
target model’s loss, outputting the value for which the loss is
closest to the target’s expected training loss. Since there are
no attributes in our data sets that are explicitly annotated as
private, we randomly choose five attributes, and perform the
attribute inference attack on each attribute independently, and
report the averaged results.
Hyperparameters. For both data sets, we train logistic re-
gression and neural network models with `2 regularization.
First, we train a non-private model and perform a grid search
over the regularization coefficient λ to find the value that min-
imizes the classification error on the test set. For CIFAR-100,
we found optimal values to be λ = 10−5 for logistic regres-
sion and λ = 10−4 for neural network. For Purchase-100, we
found optimal values to be λ = 10−5 for logistic regression
and λ = 10−8 for neural network. Next, we fix this setting to
train differentially private models using gradient perturbation.
We vary  between 0.01 and 1000 while keeping δ = 10−5,
and report the accuracy loss and privacy leakage. The choice
of δ = 10−5 satisfies the requirement that δ should be smaller
than the inverse of the training set size 10,000. We use the
ADAM optimizer for training and fix the learning rate to 0.01
with a batch size of 200. Due to the random noise addition,
all the experiments are repeated five times and the average
results and standard errors are reported. We do not assume
pre-trained model parameters, unlike the prior works of Abadi
et al. [1] and Yu et al. [76].
Clipping. For gradient perturbation, clipping is required to
bound the sensitivity of the gradients. We tried clipping at
both the batch and per-instance level. Batch clipping is more
computationally efficient and a standard practice in deep learn-
ing. On the other hand, per-instance clipping uses the privacy
budget more efficiently, resulting in more accurate models
for a given privacy budget. We use the TensorFlow Privacy
framework [2] which implements both batch and per-instance
clipping. We fix the clipping threshold at C = 1.
Figure 1 compares the accuracy loss of logistic regression
models trained over CIFAR-100 data set with both batch clip-
ping and per-instance clipping. Per-instance clipping allows
learning more accurate models for all values of  and ampli-
fies the differences between the different mechanisms. For
example, while none of the models learn anything useful when
using batch clipping, the model trained with RDP achieves
accuracy close to the non-private model for  = 100 when
performing per-instance clipping. Hence, for the rest of the
paper we only report the results for per-instance clipping.
4.2 Logistic Regression Results
We train `2-regularized logistic regression models on both the
CIFAR-100 and Purchase-100 data sets.
CIFAR-100. The baseline model for non-private logistic re-
gression achieves accuracy of 0.225 on training set and 0.155
on test set, which is competitive with the state-of-art neural
network model [62] that achieves test accuracy close to 0.20
on CIFAR-100 after training on larger data set. Thus, there is a
small generalization gap of 0.07 for the inference attacks to
exploit.
Figure 1(b) compares the accuracy loss for logistic regres-
sion models trained with different notions of differential pri-
vacy as we vary the privacy budget . As depicted in the figure,
naïve composition achieves accuracy close to 0.01 for  ≤ 10
which is random guessing for 100-class classification. Naïve
composition achieves accuracy loss close to 0 for  = 1000.
Advanced composition adds more noise than naïve composi-
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(a) Batch gradient clipping
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(b) Per-instance gradient clipping
Figure 1: Impact of clipping on accuracy loss of logistic regression (CIFAR-100).
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(a) Shokri et al. membership inference
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(b) Yeom et al. membership inference
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(c) Yeom et al. attribute inference
Figure 2: Inference attacks on logistic regression (CIFAR-100).
tion when the privacy budget is greater than the number of
training epochs ( ≥ 100), so it should never be used in such
settings. The zCDP and RDP variants achieve accuracy loss
close to 0 at  = 500 and  = 50 respectively, which is order
of magnitudes smaller than the naïve composition. This is
expected since these variations require less added noise for
the same privacy budget.
Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show the privacy leakage due to
membership inference attacks on logistic regression models.
Figure 2(a) shows results for the Shokri et al. attack [62],
which has access to the target model’s confidence scores on
the input record. Naïve composition achieves privacy leakage
close to 0 for  ≤ 10, and the leakage reaches 0.065±0.004 for
 = 1000. The RDP and zCDP variants have average leakage
close to 0.080±0.004 for  = 1000. As expected, the differ-
ential privacy variations have leakage in accordance with the
amount of noise they add for a given . The plots also include
a dashed line showing the theoretical upper bound on the
privacy leakage for -differential privacy, where the bound
is e −1 (see Section 3.1). As depicted, there is a huge gap
between the theoretical upper bound and the empirical privacy
leakage for all the variants of differential privacy. This implies
that more powerful inference attacks could exist in practice.
Figure 2(b) shows results for the white-box attacker of
Yeom et al. [75], which has access to the target model’s loss on
the input record. As expected, zCDP and RDP leak the most.
Naïve composition does not have any significant leakage for
 ≤ 10, but the leakage reaches 0.077± 0.003 for  = 1000.
The observed leakage of all the variations is in accordance
with the noise magnitude required for different differential
privacy guarantees. From Figure 1(b) and Figure 2, we see
that RDP at  = 10 achieves similar utility and privacy leakage
to NC at  = 500.
Figure 2(c) depicts the privacy leakage due to the attribute
inference attack. Naïve composition has low privacy leakage
for  ≤ 10 (attacker advantage of 0.005± 0.007 at  = 10),
but it quickly increases to 0.093± 0.002 for  = 1000. As
expected, across all variations as privacy budgets increase
both the attacker’s advantage (privacy leakage) and the model
utility (accuracy) increase.
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Figure 3: Overlap of membership predictions across two runs
of logistic regression with RDP at  = 1000 (CIFAR-100)
We further analyze the impact of privacy leakage on in-
dividual members, to understand whether exposure is more
determined by the random noise added in training or depends
on properties of particular records. To do so, we use the mem-
bership inference attack of Yeom et al. on the models trained
with RDP at  = 1000, since this is the setting where the pri-
vacy leakage is the highest. As shown in Figure 2(b), the
average leakage across five runs for this setting is 0.10 where
the average positive predictive value2 (PPV) is 0.55. On aver-
age, the attack identifies 9,196 members, of which 5,084 are
true members (out of 10,000 members) and 4,112 are false
positives (out of 10,000 non-members). To see if the members
are exposed randomly across different runs, we calculate the
overlap of membership predictions. Figure 3 illustrates the
overlap of membership predictions across two of the five runs.
Out of 9,187 membership predictions, 5,070 members are cor-
rectly identified (true positives) and 4,117 non-members are
incorrectly classified as members (false positives) in the first
run, and 5,094 members are correctly identified in the second
run. Across both the runs, there are 8,673 records predicted
as members in both runs, of which 4,805 are true members
(PPV = 0.55). Thus, the overlap is much higher than would
be expected if exposure risks was due only to the random
noise added. It depends on properties of the data, although the
relatively small increase in PPV suggests they are not highly
correlated with actual training set membership.
Figure 4 shows how many members and non-members are
predicted as members multiple times across five runs. For
comparison, the dotted line depicts the fraction of records that
would be identified as members by a test that randomly and
independently predicted membership with 0.5 probability (so,
PPV=0.5 at all points). This result corresponds to a scenario
where models are trained independently five times on the
same data set, and the adversary has access to all the model
2PPV gives the fraction of correct membership predictions among all the
membership predictions made by the attacker. A PPV value of 0.5 means
that the adversary has no advantage, i.e. the adversary cannot distinguish
between members and non-members. Thus only PPV values greater than 0.5
are of significance to the adversary.
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Figure 4: Membership predictions across multiple runs of
logistic regression with RDP at  = 1000 (CIFAR-100)
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Figure 5: Accuracy loss of logistic regression (Purchase-100).
releases. This is not a realistic attack scenario, but might ap-
proximate a scenario where a model is repeatedly retrained
using mostly similar training data. Using this extra informa-
tion, the adversary can be more confident about predictions
that are made consistently across multiple models. As the fig-
ure depicts, however, in this case the PPV increases slightly
with intersection of more runs but remains close to 0.5. Thus,
even after observing the outputs of all the five models, the
adversary has little advantage in this setting. While this seems
like the private models are performing well, the adversary
identifies 5,179 members with a PPV of 0.56 even with the
non-private model. Hence the privacy benefit here is not due
to the privacy mechanisms — even without any privacy noise,
the logistic regression model does not appear to leak enough
information to enable effective membership inference attacks.
This highlights the huge gap between the theoretical upper
bound on privacy leakage and the empirical leakage of the
implemented inference attacks (Figure 2), showing that there
could be more powerful inference attacks in practice or ways
to provide more meaningful privacy guarantees.
Purchase-100. For the Purchase-100 dataset, the baseline
model for non-private logistic regression achieves accuracy of
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(a) Shokri et al. membership inference
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(b) Yeom et al. membership inference
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(c) Yeom et al. attribute inference
Figure 6: Inference attacks on logistic regression (Purchase-100).
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Figure 7: Overlap of membership predictions across two runs
of logistic regression with RDP at  = 1000 (Purchase-100)
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Figure 8: Membership predictions across multiple runs of
logistic regression with RDP at  = 1000 (Purchase-100)
0.942 on the training set and 0.695 on test set. In comparison,
Google ML platform’s black-box trained model achieves a
test accuracy of 0.656 (see Shokri et al. [62] for details).
Figure 5 shows the accuracy loss for all the differential
privacy variants on Purchase-100. Naïve composition and ad-
vanced composition have essentially no utility until  exceeds
100. At  = 1000, naïve composition achieves accuracy loss
of 0.116± 0.003, advanced composition achieves accuracy
loss of 0.513±0.003, and the other variants achieve accuracy
loss close to 0.02. As expected, RDP achieves the best utility
across all  values.
Figure 6 compares the privacy leakage of the variants
against the inference attacks. The leakage is in accordance to
the noise each variant adds and increases proportionally with
model utility. Hence, if a model has reasonable utility, it is
bound to leak some membership information. The member-
ship inference attack of Yeom et al. is relatively more effective
than the Shokri et al. attack.
As with for CIFAR-100 data set, we analyze the vulnera-
bility of members across multiple runs of logistic regression
model trained with RDP at  = 1000. Figure 7 shows the over-
lap of membership predictions across two runs, where the
PPV increases from 0.605 for individual runs to 0.615 for the
combination of runs. Similarly to CIFAR-100, the huge overlap
of membership predictions indicates that the predictions are
not random across individual runs but the small increase in
PPV suggests that the properties that put records at risk of
identification are not strongly correlated with being training
set members. Figure 8 shows the fraction of members and
non-members that are repetitively predicted as members by
the adversary across multiple runs. The adversary correctly
predicts 4,723 members in all the five runs with a PPV of
0.63, meaning that these members are more vulnerable to the
inference attack. In contrast, the adversary correctly identifies
6,008 members using the non-private model with a PPV of
0.62. In this setting, the privacy leakage is considerable and
the PPV of 0.62 poses some threat in situations where adver-
saries may also have access to some additional information.
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(a) CIFAR-100
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(b) Purchase-100
Figure 9: Accuracy loss of neural networks.
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(a) Shokri et al. membership inference
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(b) Yeom et al. membership inference
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(c) Yeom et al. attribute inference
Figure 10: Inference attacks on neural network (CIFAR-100).
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(b) Predictions across multiple runs
Figure 11: Predictions across multiple runs of neural network with RDP at  = 1000 (CIFAR-100)
4.3 Neural Networks
We train neural network models consisting of two hidden lay-
ers and an output layer. The hidden layers have 256 neurons
that use ReLU activation. The output layer is a softmax layer
with 100 neurons, each corresponding to a class label. This
architecture is similar to the one used by Shokri et al. [62].
CIFAR-100. The baseline non-private neural network model
achieves accuracy of 1.000 on the training set and 0.168 on
test set, which is competitive to the neural network model
of Shokri et al. [62]. Their model is trained on a training set
of size 29,540 and achieves test accuracy of 0.20, whereas
our model is trained on 10,000 training instances. There is a
huge generalization gap of 0.832, which the inference attacks
can exploit. Figure 9(a) compares the accuracy loss of neural
network models trained with different notions of differential
privacy with varying privacy budget . The model trained
with naïve composition does not learn anything useful until
 = 100 (accuracy loss of 0.907±0.004), at which point the
advanced composition also has accuracy loss close to 0.935
and the other variants achieve accuracy loss close to 0.24.
None of the variants approach zero accuracy loss, even for
 = 1000. The relative performance is similar to that of the
logistic regression model discussed in Section 4.2.
Figure 10 shows the privacy leakage on neural network
models for the inference attacks. The privacy leakage for
each variant of differential privacy accords with the amount
of noise it adds to the model. At higher  values, the leakage
is significant for zCDP and RDP due to model overfitting. For
 = 1000, with the Shokri et al. attack, naïve composition has
leakage of 0.034 compared to 0.219 for zCDP and 0.277 for
RDP (above the region shown in the plot). For the Yeom et al.
attack, at  = 1000, RDP exhibits privacy leakage of 0.399, a
substantial advantage for the adversary. Naïve composition
and advanced composition achieve strong privacy against
membership inference attackers, but fail to learning anything
useful even with the highest privacy budgets tested. RDP
and zCDP are able to learn useful models at privacy budgets
above  = 100, but exhibit significant privacy leakage at the
corresponding levels. Thus, none of the CIFAR-100 NN models
seem to provide both acceptable model utility and strong
privacy.
Like we did for logistic regression, we also analyze the vul-
nerability of individual records across multiple model training
runs with RDP at  = 1000. Figure 11 shows the membership
predictions across multiple runs. In contrast to the logistic
regression results, for the neural networks the fraction of repet-
itively exposed members decreases with increasing number of
runs while the number of repeated false positives drops more
drastically, leading to a significant increase in PPV. The ad-
versary identifies 2,386 true members across all the five runs
with a PPV of 0.82. In comparison, the adversary exposes
7,716 members with 0.94 PPV using the single non-private
model. So, although the private models do leak significant
information, the privacy noise substantially diminishes the
inference attacks.
Purchase-100. The baseline non-private neural network mod-
el achieves accuracy of 0.982 on the training set and 0.605 on
test set. In comparison, the neural network model of Shokri et
al. [62] trained on a similar data set (but with 600 attributes
instead of 100 as in our data set) achieves 0.670 test accuracy.
Figure 9(b) compares the accuracy loss of neural network
models trained with different variants of differential privacy.
The trends are similar to those for the logistic regression mod-
els (Figure 5). The zCDP and RDP variants achieve model
utility close to the non-private baseline for  = 1000, while
naïve composition continues to suffer from high accuracy
loss (0.372). Advanced composition has higher accuracy loss
of 0.702 for  = 1000 as it requires addition of more noise
than naïve composition when  is greater than the number of
training epochs.
Figure 12 shows the privacy leakage comparison of the
variants against the inference attacks. The results are consis-
tent with those observed for CIFAR-100. Similar to the models
in other settings, we analyze the vulnerability of members
across multiple runs of neural network model trained with
RDP at  = 1000. Figure 13(a) shows the overlap of member-
ship predictions across two runs, while the figure 13(b) shows
the fraction of members and non-members classified as mem-
bers by the adversary across multiple runs. The PPV increases
with intersection of more runs, but less information is leaked
than for the CIFAR-100 models. The adversary correctly iden-
tifies 3,807 members across all five runs with a PPV of 0.66.
In contrast, the adversary predicts 9,461 members with 0.64
PPV using the non-private model.
4.4 Discussion
While the tighter cumulative privacy loss bounds provided
by variants of differential privacy improve model utility for a
given privacy budget, the reduction in noise increases vulnera-
bility to inference attacks. While these definitions still satisfy
the (,δ)-differential privacy guarantees, the meaningful value
of these guarantees diminishes rapidly with high  values.
Although the theoretical guarantees provided by differential
privacy are very appealing, once  values exceed small values,
the practical value of these guarantees is insignificant—in
most of our inference attack figures, the theoretical bound
given by -DP falls off the graph before any measurable pri-
vacy leakage occurs (and at levels well before models provide
acceptable utility). The value of these privacy mechanisms
comes not from the theoretical guarantees, but from the im-
pact of the mechanism on what realistic adversaries can infer.
Thus, for the same privacy budget, differential privacy tech-
niques that produce tighter bounds and result in lower noise
requirements come with increased concrete privacy risks.
We note that in our inference attack experiments, we use
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Figure 12: Inference attacks on neural network (Purchase-100).
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Figure 13: Predictions across multiple runs of neural network with RDP at  = 1000 (Purchase-100)
equal numbers of member and non-member records which
provides 50-50 prior success probability to the attacker. Thus,
even an -DP implementation might leak even for small 
values, though we did not observe any such leakage. Alterna-
tively, a skewed prior probability may lead to smaller leakage
even for large  values. Our goal in this work is to evalu-
ate scenarios where risk of inference is high, so the use of
50-50 prior probability is justified. We also emphasize that
our results show the privacy leakage due to three particular
inference attacks. Attacks only get better, so future attacks
may be able to infer more than is shown in our experiments.
5 Conclusion
Differential privacy has earned a well-deserved reputation pro-
viding principled and powerful mechanisms for establishing
privacy guarantees. However, when it is implemented for chal-
lenging tasks such as machine learning, compromises must be
made to preserve utility. It is essential that the privacy impact
of those compromises is well understood when differential
privacy is deployed to protect sensitive data. Our results re-
veal that the commonly-used combinations of  values and the
variations of differential privacy in practical implementations
may provide unacceptable utility-privacy trade-offs. We hope
our study will encourage more careful assessments of the
practical privacy value of formal claims based on differential
privacy, and lead to deeper understanding of the privacy im-
pact of design decisions when deploying differential privacy.
There remains a huge gap between what the state-of-the-art
inference attacks can infer, and the guarantees provided by
differential privacy. Research is needed to understand the
limitations of inference attacks, and eventually to develop
solutions that provide desirable, and well understood, utility-
privacy trade-offs.
Availability
Open source code for reproducing all of our experiments is
available at https://github.com/bargavj/EvaluatingDPML.
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